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Abstract
Self-tuning experience weighted attraction (EWA) is a one-parameter theory of learning in
games. It addresses a criticism that an earlier model (EWA) has too many parameters, by
ﬁxing some parameters at plausible values and replacing others with functions of experience
so that they no longer need to be estimated. Consequently, it is econometrically simpler
than the popular weighted ﬁctitious play and reinforcement learning models.
The functions of experience which replace free parameters “self-tune” over time, adjusting
in a way that selects a sensible learning rule to capture subjects’ choice dynamics. For
instance, the self-tuning EWA model can turn from a weighted ﬁctitious play into an av-
eraging reinforcement learning as subjects equilibrate and learn to ignore inferior foregone
payoﬀs. The theory was tested on seven diﬀerent games, and compared to the earlier para-
metric EWA model and a one-parameter stochastic equilibrium theory (QRE). Self-tuning
EWA does as well as EWA in predicting behavior in new games, even though it has fewer
parameters, and ﬁts reliably better than the QRE equilibrium benchmark.
1 Introduction
The power of equilibrium models of games comes from their ability to produce precise predic-
tions using only the structure of a game and assumptions about players’ rationality. Statistical
models of learning, on the other hand, often need data to calibrate free parameters in order to
generate predictions about behavior in new games. This calibration-prediction process, while
standard in econometrics, gives rise to two unresolved issues for learning models: the value of
additional parameters in a generalized model, and explaining apparent cross-game variation in
learning rules.
The ﬁrst unresolved issue is how to judge the value of incremental parameters when com-
paring models with diﬀerent numbers of parameters. For example, the EWA learning model
(Camerer and Ho, 1999) econometically nests the weighted ﬁctitious play (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998) and averaging reinforcement learning (Erev and Roth, 1998) models, As a result,
the EWA model has 2 and 3 more parameters than weighted ﬁctitious play and averaging rein-
forcement learning, respectively. There are many standard statistical procedures for comparing
models with diﬀerent numbers of parameters. One popular approach is generalized likelihood
ratio tests which penalize theories for extra free parameters (e.g., the Akaike or Bayesian in-
formaton criteria). Another approach is to judge the predictive power of a learning model
out-of-sample (i.e., after parameter values have been estimated) in both existing and brand
new games. The results from prior studies suggest that the additional parameters in EWA
are helpful in improving predictions of behavior at least in some games, by either Bayesian
information criteria or out-of-sample ﬁt (e.g., Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002).
In this paper we take a diﬀerent approach: By reducing the number of estimated parameters
in the EWA model. Ideally, the methods used to reduce parameters are behaviorally principled
and insightful. We reduce parameters in two ways: Fixing parameters to speciﬁc numerical
values; and replacing estimable parameters with functions of data.
Fixing a parameter value numerically can reduce the general EWA speciﬁcation. There are
two parameter restrictions which reduce general EWA learning models so that they still include
many familiar special cases. It is also helpful to replace the free parameters which represent the
initial strengths of strategies, rather than estimating them, because initial conditions are not of
central interest in studying learning (their initial impact typically declines rapidly as learning
takes place). We replace estimation of initial conditions with a priori numerical values derived
from a cognitive hierarchy model that was designed to predict how people play one shot games
(Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004), although other models could be used instead.
Replacing a free parameter with a function which depends on observed experience means
the parameter does not have to be estimated from data. The functional value can also vary
over time, games, and diﬀerent players. The key for these functions to ﬁt well and to generate
insight lies in using behaviorally plausible principles to derive the functional forms. We use this
functional approach to replace parameters that represent the decay weights placed on recent
and distant experience, and the weight placed on foregone payoﬀs from strategies that were not
chosen.
By replacing three EWA parameters with sensibly determined numerical values and two
EWA parameters with behaviorally disciplined functions of experience, the resulting self-tuning
EWA model has only one free parameter, fewer than typical versions of reinforcement and
weighted ﬁctitious play models. The goal is to make the self-tuning EWA model as predictive
as the original parametric EWA model while reducing the number of parameters as much as
possible.
The second unresolved issue is how to model cross-game variation in parameters of learning
theories. Several studies have shown that the best-ﬁtting parameter values of learning rules vary
signiﬁcantly across games and across subjects (see for example Yin-Wong Cheung and Daniel
Friedman, 1997 and Colin Camerer and Teck Ho, 1999; for a comprehensive review, see Camerer,
2003). Some learning theorists regard parameter variation across games as a “disappointment”
(e.g., Guillaume Frechette, 2003, p. 42). We disagree and regard variation across games as
a natural reﬂection of the heterogeneity in the learning environment (as determined by the
game structure and the history of play). Modelling cross-game variation should be viewd as a
scientiﬁc challenge.
One could abandon the search for a single rule that predicts well across games, and instead
build up a catalog of which rules ﬁt well in which games. We do otherwise, by developing
a learning model which ﬂexibly “self-tunes” the parameters of our earlier EWA model across
game, subjects, and time (inspired by self-tuning control and Kalman ﬁltering2). The model
2Erev, Bereby-Meyer and Roth (1999) use a response sensitivity parameter which is “self-adjusting” in a
similar way. They divide the ﬁxed parameter (λ in the notation below) by the average absolute deviation of
received payoﬀs from historically average payoﬀ. As a result, when equilibration occurs the payoﬀ variance shrinks
and the adjusted λ rises, which sharpens convergence to equilibrium. (This remedies a problem noted by Jasmina
posits a single family of self-tuning functions which can be applied to a wide variety of games.
The functions are the same in all games, but the interaction of game structure and experience
will generate diﬀerent parameter values from the functions, both across games and across time
within a game. We ﬁnd that the self-tuning functions can reproduce parameter variation well
enough that the model out-predicts models which estimate separate parameters for diﬀerent
games, in forecasting behavior in new games.
Since many familiar learning rules correspond to particular values of decay and foregone
payoﬀ weights, endogeneous changes in these parameters through their functional forms in self-
tuning EWA also creates variation in rules over time, a reduced-form variant of ”rule learning”.3
One key function is the decay rate φi(t), which weights previous experience. The self-tuning
value of φi(t) falls when another player’s behavior changes sharply (a kind of deliberate forget-
ting resulting from change-detection or surprise). This change is like switching from a pure ﬁcti-
tious play belief learning rule (which weights all past experience equally) to a rapidly-adjusting
Cournot belief learning rule (which weights only the last period and ignores previous periods).
The change captures the idea that if their opponents are suddenly behaving diﬀerently than in
the past, players should ignore their distant experience and concentrate only on what happened
recently. (Albert Marcet and Juan Pablo Nicolini, 2004, use a similar change-detection model
to explain learning in repeated monetary hyperinﬂations).
The second key function is the weight given to foregone payoﬀs, δij(t), in updating the
numerical attractions of strategies. This weight is one for strategies that yield better or equal
payoﬀs than the payoﬀ a player actually received, and zero for strategies that yield worse than
actual payoﬀs. If players start out choosing bad strategies, then the weights on most alternative
strategies are 1, and the rule is approximately the same as belief learning (i.e., reinforcing all
strategies’ payoﬀs equally). But when players are in a strict pure-strategy equilibrium, all other
strategies have worse payoﬀs and so the rule is equivalent to choice reinforcement.
While the self-tuning EWA model is honed on data from several game experiments, it should
be of interest to economists of all sorts because learning is important for virtually every area
Arifovic and John Ledyard, 2002– in games with many strategies, learning models predict less convergence in
strategy frequencies than is observed.) Their model also has the interesting property that when the game changes
and received payoﬀs suddenly change, the adjusted λ rises, ﬂattening the proﬁle of choice probabilities which
causes players to “explore” their new environment more.
3Variation over time in EWA might be more aptly called rule adjustment. It is diﬀerent than directly
reinforcing diﬀerent rules according to payoﬀs of strategies those rules recommend, as in Stahl, 2000.
of economics.4 Much as in physical sciences, in the lab we can see clearly how various theories
perform in describing behavior (and giving valuable advice) before applying those theories
to more complex ﬁeld applications. Since self-tuning EWA is designed to work across many
economic domains, sensible extensions of it could be applied to ﬁeld settings such as evolution
of economic institutions (e.g., internet auctions or pricing), investors and policymakers learning
about equity market ﬂuctuations or macroeconomic phenomena (as in Allan Timmerman, 1993,
or Marcet and Nicolini, 2004), and consumer choice (e.g., Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong, 2003).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the self-tuning EWA
model and its parametric precursor. In section 3, self-tuning EWA is used to ﬁt and predict
data from seven experimental data sets. The hardest kind of prediction is to estimate free
parameters on one sample of games and predict play in a new game. Self-tuning EWA does
well in this kind of cross-game prediction. Section 4 concludes.
2 Self-tuning EWA
First, some notation is necessary. For player i, there are mi strategies, denoted s
j
i (the j-th
strategy for player i), which have initial attractions denoted Aji (0). Strategies actually chosen
by i in period t, and by all other players (who are denoted −i) are si(t) and s−i(t) respectively.
4Since its ﬁrst exposition in 2001, the self tuning model has succeeded in many robustness tests in which other
researchers applied the model to many games that are substantially diﬀerent from the seven games we validated
the model on in this paper. We highlight three pieces of work here: Kocher and Sutter (2005) data stretches the
model to explain choices made by groups ; Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter (2002) and Sovik (2001) are games of
incomplete information (All seven games we studied are games with complete information.)
Kocher and Sutter (2005)’s data are choices made by individual and three-person groups in p-beauty contests.
Competing groups appear to learn much faster than individuals. Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter (2002) report
data from a 2x2 coordination game with incomplete information, studying theories of “global games”. In their
games, players receive a private signal (knowing the distribution of private signals) which shows the payoﬀs in a
signal-dependent stag-hunt coordination game. The game was designed so that iterated dominance leads subjects
to select the risk-dominant outcome. Sovik (2001) reports data from a zero-sum betting game with asymmetric
information. Two players simultaneously choose between a safe outside option and a zero-sum game based on
their information sets. The information sets were chosen such that the game is dominance solvable. Players
should ﬁgure out that they should never bet because they can only bet against players with better information.
The self-tuning model ﬁts the data well in all three datasets. Speciﬁc estimation result is available in our longer
working paper version or by request. We have also recently extended the self-tuning model to study sophistication
and quantal response equilibrium in repeated trust and entry games (Chong, Ho and Camerer, in press).
Player i’s ex-post payoﬀ of choosing strategy sji in time t is πi(s
j
i , s−i(t)) and the actual payoﬀ
received is πi(si(t), s−i(t)) ≡ πi(t).
For player i, strategy j has a numerical attraction Aji (t) after updating from period t expe-
rience. Aji (0) are initial attractions before the game starts. Attractions determine choice prob-
abilities in period t+1 through a logistic stochastic response function, P ji (t+1) =
e
λ·Aj
i
(t)
∑mi
k=1
e
λ·Ak
i
(t)
,
where λ is the response sensitivity. Note that λ = 0 is random response and λ = ∞ is best-
response.
In the parametric EWA model, attractions are updated by
A
j
i (t) =
φ ·N (t− 1) · Aji (t− 1) + [δ + (1− δ) · I(sji , si(t))] · πi(sji , s−i(t))
N (t− 1) · φ · (1− κ) + 1 (2.1)
where I(x, y) is an indicator function (equal to zero if x = y and one if x = y) (see Camerer
and Ho, 1999). That is, previous attractions are multiplied by an experience weight N (t− 1),
decayed by a weight φ, incremented by either the payoﬀ received (when I(sji , si(t)) = 1) or by
δ times the foregone payoﬀ (when I(sji , si(t)) = 0), and pseudo-normalized.
EWA is a hybrid of the central features of reinforcement and ﬁctitious play (belief learning)
models. This hybrid is useful if actual learning mixes components of those simpler rules. A
hybrid is also useful for evaluating the statistical and economic advantages of complicating the
simpler models by adding components (and, consequently, for ﬁnding out when simple rules are
adequate approximations and when they are not).
Standard reinforcement models assume that only actual choices are reinforced (i.e., δ = 0).5
When δ = 0 and κ = 1 the rule is like the cumulative reinforcement model of Roth and Erev
(1995). When δ = 0 and κ = 0 it is like the averaging reinforcement model of Erev and Roth
(1998). A central insight from the EWA formulation is that weighted ﬁctitious play belief
learning is exactly the same as a generalization of reinforcement in which all foregone payoﬀs
5See Calvin Harley (1981), Roth and Erev (1995), Sarin and Vahid (2001) (cf. Robert R. Bush and Frederick
Mosteller, 1955; John Cross, 1983; Patrick McAllister, 1991; Brian Arthur, 1991). Choice reinforcement is most
sensible when players do not know the foregone payoﬀs of unchosen strategies. However, several studies show that
providing foregone payoﬀ information aﬀects learning (See Dilip Mookerjhee and Barry Sopher (1994), Amnon
Rapoport and Erev (1998), and John Van Huyck, Ray Battalio and Frederick Rankin (2005)), which suggests
that players do not simply reinforce chosen strategies. Rajiv Sarin and Farshid Vahid, 2003, show that “spilling”
over payoﬀ reinforcement to neighboring strategies can explain the rapid pace of learning in the Van Huyck et
al. (1996) game.
are reinforced by a weight δ = 1 (when κ = 0).6 Intuitively, the EWA form allows both the
stronger focus on payoﬀs that are actually received, as in reinforcement (i.e., δ < 1) and the
idea that foregone payoﬀs usually aﬀect learning when they are known, as in ﬁctitious play
(i.e., δ > 0). Figure 1 is a cube that shows the universe of learning rules captured by the EWA
learning model and the positions of various familiar cases.
As shown in Figure 1, the front face of the cube (κ = 0) captures almost all familiar
special cases except for the cumulative reinforcement model. The cumulative model has been
supplanted by the averaging model (with κ = 0) because the latter seems to be more robust in
predicting behavior in some games (see Erev and Roth 1998). This sub-class of EWA learning
models is the simplest model that nests averaging reinforcement and weighted ﬁcititous play
(and hence Cournot and simple ﬁctitious play) as special cases. It can also capture a weighted
ﬁctitious play model using time-varying belief weights (such as the stated-beliefs model explored
by Yaw Nyarko and Andy Schotter, 2002), as long as subjects are allowed to use a diﬀerent
weight to decay lagged attractions over time (i.e., move along the top edge of the side in Figure
1). There is also an empirical reason to set κ to a particular value. Our prior work suggests that
κ does not seem to aﬀect ﬁt much (e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1999; Ho, Xin Wang, and Camerer,
2004).
The initial experience N (0) was included in the original EWA model so that Bayesian
learning models are nested as a special case– N (0) represents the strength of prior beliefs. We
restrict N (0) = 1 here because its inﬂuence fades rapidly as an experiment progresses and most
subjects come to experiments with weak priors anyway. The speciﬁcation of initial attractions
is not speciﬁc to a learning rule. All learning rules that use attraction as latent variable to
predict behavior must face with this problem. We use a “cognitive hierarchy” (CH) theory
of games (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004) to provide the initial attraction values because it
has been shown to predict behavior well in many one-shot games. In the CH theory, each
player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has a hierarchy of
categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other
players are distributed over step 0 through step k < 1. Since an average of 1.5 steps ﬁts data
well from many games, we use that value to set initial attractions.7
6See also Cheung and Friedman, 1997, pp. 54-55; Drew Fudenberg and David Levine, 1998, pp. 1084-1085;
Ed Hopkins, 2002.
7There are at least three other ways to pin down the initial attractions Aji (0). You can either use the
ﬁrst-period data to “burn-in” the attractions, assume all initial attractions are equal (which leads to uniformly-
distributed ﬁrst-period choices), or assume players use a decision rule that best-responds to a uniform distribution.
Consequently, we are left with three free parameters– φ, δ, and λ. To make the model simple
to estimate statistically, and self-tuning, the parameters φ and δ are replaced by deterministic
functions φi(t) and δij(t) of player i’s experience with strategy j, up to period t. These func-
tions determine numerical parameter values for each player, strategy, and period, which are
then plugged into the EWA updating equation above to determine attractions in each period.
Updated attractions determine choice probabilities according to the logit rule, given a value of
λ. Standard maximum-likelihood methods for optimizing ﬁt can then be used to ﬁnd which λ
ﬁts best.8
2.1 The change-detector function φi(t)
The decay rate φ which weights lagged attractions is sometimes called “forgetting” (an interpre-
tation which is carried over from reinforcement models of animal learning). While forgetting
obviously does occur, the more interesting variation in φi(t) across games, and across time
within a game, is a player’s perception of how quickly the learning environment is changing.
The function φi(t) should therefore “detect change”. When a player senses that other players
are changing, a self-tuning φi(t) should dip down, putting less weight on distant experience. As
in physical change detectors (e.g., security systems or smoke alarms), the challenge is to detect
change when it is really occurring, but not falsely mistake small ﬂuctuations for real changes
too often.
The core of the φi(t) change-detector function is a “surprise index”, which is the diﬀerence
between other players’ recent strategies and their strategies in previous periods. First deﬁne
a history vector, across the other players’ strategies k, which records the historical frequencies
(including the last period t) of the choices by other players. The vector element hki (t) is∑t
τ=1
I(sk−i,s−i(τ ))
t .
9 The recent ‘history’ rki (t) is a vector of 0’s and 1’s which has a one for
strategy sk−i = s−i(t) and 0’s for all other strategies s
k
−i (i.e., r
k
i (t) = I(s
k
−i, s−i(t))). The
The cognitive hierarchy approach uses a speciﬁc mixture of the latter two rules but adds further steps of iterated
thinking in a precise way. Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001) explore
richer reasoning-step models.
8If one is interested only in the hit rate– the frequency with which the predicted choice is the same as what a
player actually picked– then it is not necessary to estimate λ. The strategy that has the highest attraction will
be the predicted choice. The response sensitivity λ only dictates how frequently the highest-attraction choice is
actually picked, which is irrelevant if the statistical criterion is hit rate.
9Note that if there is more than one other player, and the distinct choices by diﬀerent other player’s matter
to player i, then the vector is an n− 1- dimensional matrix if there are n players.
surprise index Si(t) simply sums up the squared deviations between the cumulative history
vector hki (t) and the immediate recent history vector r
k
i (t); that is,
Si(t) =
m−i∑
k=1
(hki (t)− rki (t))2. (2.2)
In other words, the surprise index captures the degree of change of the most recent observation10
from the historical average. Note that it varies from zero (when the last strategy the other player
chose is the one they have always chosen before) to two (when the other player chose a particular
strategy ‘forever’ and suddenly switches to something brand new). When surprise index is
zero, we have a stationary environment; when it is one, we have a turbulent environment. The
change-detecting decay rate is:
φi(t) = 1− 12 · Si(t). (2.3)
Because Si(t) is between zero and two, φ is always (weakly) between one and zero.
Some numerical boundary cases help illuminate how the change-detection works. If the
other player chooses the strategy she has always chosen before, then Si(t) = 0 (player i is not
surprised) and φi(t) = 1 (player i does not decay the lagged attraction at all, since what other
players did throughout is informative). The opposite case is when an opponent has previously
chosen a single strategy in every period, and suddenly switches to a new strategy. In that case,
φi(t) is 2t−1t2 . This expression declines gracefully toward zero as the string of identical choices
up to period t grows longer. (For t = 2, 3, 5 and 10 the φi(t) values are .75, .56, .36, and .19.)
The fact that the φ values decline with t expresses the principle that a new choice is bigger
surprise (and should have an associated lower φ) if it follows a longer string of identical choices
which are diﬀerent from the surprising new choice. Note that since the observed behavior in
period t is included in the history hki (t), φi(t) will never dip completely to zero. (which could
be a mistake because it erases all the history embodied in the lagged attraction). For example,
if a player chose the same strategy for each of 19 periods and a new strategy in period 20, then
φi(t) = 39/400 = .0975.
Another interesting special case is when unique strategies have been played in every period
up to t − 1, and another unique strategy is played in period t. (This is often true in games
10In games with mixed equilibria (and no pure equilibria), a player should expect other players’ strategies to
vary. Therefore, if the game has a mixed equilibrium with W strategies which are played with positive probability,
the surprise index deﬁnes recent history over a window of the last W periods (e.g., in a game with four strategies
that are played in equilibrium, W = 4). Then rki (t) =
∑m−i
k=1
[
∑t
τ=t−W+1 I(s
k
−i,s−i(τ))
W
].
with large strategy spaces.) Then φi(t) = .5 + 12t , which starts at .75 and asymptotes at .5 as
t increases. Comparing the case where the previous strategy was the same, and the previous
strategies were all diﬀerent, it is evident that if the choice in period t is new, the value of φi(t)
is higher if there were more variation in previous choices, and lower if there were less variation.
This mimicks a hypothesis-testing approach (cf. Marcet and Nicolini, 2003) in which more
variation in previous strategies implies that players are less likely to conclude there has been a
regime shift, and therefore do not lower the value of φi(t) too much.
Note that the change-detector function φi(t) is individual and time speciﬁc and it depends
on information feedback. Nyarko and Schotter (2002) show that a weighted ﬁctitious play
model that uses stated beliefs (instead of empirical beliefs posited by the ﬁctitious play rule)
can predict behavior better than the original EWA model in games with unique mixed-strategy
equilibrium. One way to intrepret their result is that their model allows each subject to attach
a diﬀerent weight to previous experiences over time. In the same vein, the proposed change-
detector function allows for individual and time heterogeneity by positing them theoretically.
2.2 The attention function, δij(t)
The parameter δ is the weight on foregone payoﬀs. Presumably this is tied to the attention
subjects pay to alternative payoﬀs, ex-post. Subjects who have limited attention are likely
to focus on strategies that would have given higher payoﬀs than what was actually received,
because these strategies present missed opportunities (cf. Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Collel
(2001), who show that such a regret-driven rule converges to correlated equilibrium.) To capture
this property, deﬁne11
δij(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if πi(s
j
i , s−i(t)) ≥ πi(t),
0 otherwise.
(2.4)
That is, subjects reinforce chosen strategies and all unchosen strategies with (weakly) better
payoﬀs by a weight of one. They reinforce unchosen strategies with strictly worse payoﬀs by
zero.
11In games with unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, we use δij(t) =
1
W
if πi(s
j
i , s−i(t)) ≥ πi(t) and 0 otherwise.
This modiﬁcation is driven by the empirical observation that estimated δ’s are often close to zero in mixed games
(which might also be due to misspeciﬁed heterogeneity, see Nathaniel Wilcox, 2003). Using only δij(t) without
this adjustment produces slightly worse ﬁts in the two mixed-equilibrium games examined below where the
adjustment matters (patent-rate games and the Mookerjhee-Sopher games).
Note that this δij(t) can transform the self-tuning rule into special cases over time. If
subjects are strictly best-responding (ex post), then no other strategies have a higher ex-post
payoﬀ so δij(t) = 0 for all strategies j which were not chosen, which reduces the model to
choice reinforcement. However if they always choose the worst strategy, then δij(t) = 1, which
corresponds to weighted ﬁctitious play. If subjects neither choose the best nor the worst strategy,
the updating scheme will push them (probabilistically) towards those strategies that yield better
payoﬀs, as is both characteristic of human learning and normatively sensible.
The updating rule is a natural way to formalize and extend the “learning direction” theory of
Selten and Stoecker (1986). Their theory consists of an appealing property of learning: Subject
move in the direction of ex-post best-response. Broad applicability of the theory has been
hindered by deﬁning ‘direction’ only in terms of numerical properties of ordered strategies (e.g.,
choosing ‘higher prices’ if the ex-post best response is a higher price than the chosen price).
The self-tuning δij(t) deﬁnes the ‘direction’ of learning set-theoretically, as shifting probability
toward the set of strategies with higher payoﬀs than the chosen ones.
The self-tuning δij(t) also creates the “exploration-exploitation” shift in machine learning
(familiar to economists from multi-armed bandit problems). In low-information environments,
it makes sense to explore a wide range of strategies, then gradually lock in to a choice with a good
historical relative payoﬀs. In self-tuning EWA, if subjects start out with a poor choice, many
unchosen strategies will be reinforced by their (higher) foregone payoﬀs, which shifts choice
probability to those choices and captures why subjects “explore”. As equilibration occurs, only
the chosen strategy will be reinforced, thereby producing an “exploitation” or “lock-in” (cf.
Erev et al., 1999). This is behaviorally very plausible. The updating scheme also helps to
detect any change in environment. If a previously optimal response becomes inferior because
of an exogenous change, other strategies will have higher ex-post payoﬀs, triggering higher
δij(t) values (and reinforcement of superior payoﬀs) and guiding players to re-explore better
strategies.
The self-tuning δij(t) function can also be seen as a reasonable all-purpose rule which con-
serves a scarce cognitive resource– attention. The hybrid EWA model showed that weighted
ﬁctitious play is equivalent to generalized reinforcement in which all strategies are reinforced.
But reinforcing many strategies takes attention. As equilibration occurs, the set of strategies
which receive positive δij(t) weights shrinks so attention is conserved when spreading attention
widely is no longer useful. When an opponent’s play changes suddenly, the self-tuning φi(t)
value drops. This change reduces attractions (since lagged attractions are strongly decayed) and
spreads choice probability over a wider range of strategies due to the logit response rule. This
implies that the strategy chosen may no longer be optimal, leading δij(t) to allocate attention
over a wider range of better-responses. Thus, the self-tuning system can be seen as procedurally
rational (in Herbert Simon’s language) because it follows a precise algorithm and is designed to
express the basic features of how people learn– by exploring a wide range of options, locking in
when a good strategy is found, but re-allocating attention when environmental change demands
such action.
A theorist’s instinct is to derive conditions when ﬂexible learning rules choose parameters
optimally, which is certainly a direction to explore in future research (cf. Dana Heller and
Sarin, 2000; Jens Josephson, 2001). However, broadly-optimal rules will likely depend on the
set of games an all-purpose learning agent encounters, and also may depend sensitively on how
cognitive costs are speciﬁed (and should also jibe with data on the details of neural mechanisms,
which are not yet well-understood). So it is unlikely to ﬁnd a universally optimal rule that can
always beat rules which adapt locally.
Our approach is more like exploratory work in machine learning. Machine learning theorists
try to develop robust heuristic algorithms which learn eﬀectively in a wide variety of low-
information environments (see Sutton and Barto 1998). Good machine learning rules are not
provably optimal but perform well on tricky test cases and natural problems like those which
good computerized robots need to perform (navigating around obstacles, hill-climbing on rugged
landscapes, diﬃcult pattern recognition, and so forth).
Before proceeding to estimation, it is useful to summarize the properties of the self-tuning
model. First, the use of simple ﬁctitious play and reinforcement theories in empirical analysis
are often justiﬁed by the fact that they have few free parameters. The self-tuning EWA is useful
by this criterion as well because it requires estimating only one parameter, λ (which is diﬃcult to
do without in empirical work). Second, the functions in self-tuning EWA naturally vary across
time, people, games, and strategies. The potential advantage of this ﬂexibility is that the
model can predict across new games better than parametric methods. Whether this advantage
is realized will be examined below. Third, the self-tuning parameters can endogenously shift
across rules. Early in a game, when opponent choices vary a lot and players are likely to
make ex-post mistakes, the model automatically generates low values of φi(t) and high δij(t)
weights– it resembles Cournot belief learning. As equilibration occurs and behavior of other
players stabilizes, φi(t) rises and δij(t) falls– it resembles reinforcement learning. The model
therefore keeps a short window of history (low φ) and pays a lot of attention (high δ) when it
should, early in a game, and conserves those cognitive resources by remembering more (high φ)
and attending to fewer foregone strategies (low δ) when it can aﬀord to, as equilibration occurs.
3 Self-tuning EWA predictions within and across games
In this section we compare in-sample ﬁt and out-of-sample predictive accuracy of self-tuning
EWA, its predecessor (EWA) where parameters are freely estimated, and the one-parameter
Quantal Response Equilibrium model benchmark (Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey,
1995).12 The goal is to see whether self-tuning EWA functions can produce game-speciﬁc
parameters which are similar to values estimated separately in diﬀerent games. In addition, we
use a jackknife approach by estimating a common set of parameters on n − 1 of the n games
and use the estimated parameters to predict choices in the remaining game, to judge how well
models predict across games (cf. Erev and Roth, 1998).
We use seven games: Two matrix games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium (Dilip
Mookerjhee and Barry Sopher, 1997); R&D patent race games (Amnon Rapoport and Wilfred
Amaldoss, 2000); a median-action order statistic coordination game with several players (John
Van Huyck, Ray Battalio, and Richard Beil, 1990); a continental-divide coordination game,
in which convergence behavior is extremely sensitive to initial conditions (Van Huyck, Joseph
Cook, and Battalio, 1997); a coordination game in which players choose whether to enter a large
or small market (Amaldoss and Ho, 2001); dominance-solvable p-beauty contests (Ho, Camerer,
and Keith Weigelt, 1998); and a price matching game called traveler’s dilemma (Monica Capra,
Jacob Goeree, Rosario Gomez and Charles Holt, 1999).
Table 1 summarizes features of these games and the data. Three of the games are described
in detail below.13 Many diﬀerent games are studied because a main goal is to see how well
12Our working paper also reports ﬁt statistics and estimates from belief learning and reinforcement models.
13The other four games are: Mixed-equilibrium games studied by Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997) which have
four or six strategies, one of which is weakly-dominated; the nine-player median-action game studied by Van
Huyck et al. (1990), in which players choose integer strategies 1-7 and earn payoﬀs increasing linearly in the
group median and decreasing linearly in the squared deviation from the median; a traveler’s dilemma game
(Capra et al., 1999) in which players choose numbers from 80 to 200 and each player receives the a payoﬀ equal
to the minimum of the chosen numbers and the player who chose the low number receives a bonus of R from
the player who chose the high number; and a coordination game (Amaldoss and Ho, 2001) in which n players
simultaneously enter a large or small market and earn 2n (n) divided by the number of entrants if they enter the
large (small) market.
self-tuning EWA can explain cross-game variation. Sampling widely is also a good way to test
robustness of any model of learning or equilibrium. Models that are customized to explain
one game are insightful, but not as useful as games which explain disparate patterns with one
general model (see Roth and Erev, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 2001).
3.1 Estimation method
Consider a game where N subjects play T rounds. For a given player i, the likelihood function
of observing a choice history of {si(1), si(2), . . . , si(T − 1), si(T )} is given by:
ΠTt=1P
si(t)
i (t|λ) (3.1)
The joint likelihood function L(λ) of observing all players’ choice is given by
L(λ) = ΠNi {ΠTt=1P si(t)i (t|λ)} (3.2)
To determine the predicted probabilities P si(t)i (t|λ), we start with initial attractions Aji (0)
(which are the same for all i) determined by the predictions of the cognitive hierarchy model
(Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003, 2004) using τ = 1.5.14 After each period, the functions φi(t)
and δij(t) are updated according to player i’s experience and applied to the self-tuning EWA
model (ﬁxing λ) to determine updated attractions according to the EWA rule. The updated
attractions produce predicted probabilities P si(t)i (t|λ). Using the ﬁrst 70% of the subjects in
each game, we determine the value of λ that maximizes the total likelihood over the 70% of the
subjects. Then the value of λ is frozen and used to forecast behavior of the entire path of the
remaining 30% of the subjects.15 Payoﬀs were converted to inﬂation-adjusted dollars (which
is important for cross-game forecasting) and scaled by subtracting the lowest possible payoﬀs.
Randomized bootstrap resampling is used to calculate parameter standard errors.16
14In the games we study, for example, one-step behavior predicts choices of 35 in beauty contests, 7 in
continental-divide games, 4 in median-action games, the large pot in entry-choice games, 5 and 4 in patent-
race games for strong and weak players, and 200− 2R in traveler’s dilemma games.
15We also tried using the ﬁrst 70% of the observations from each subject, then forecasted the last 30%. The
results are similar.
16In the ﬁrst few periods of a game, players often learn rapidly. To capture this, we smooth the φi(t) function
by starting at 0.5, and gently blending in the updated values according to φˆi(t) ≡ .5/t + (t − 1)φi(t)/t in the
empirical implementation.
In addition to self-tuning EWA, we estimated both the parametric EWA model and the one-
parameter quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model. QRE is a static no-learning benchmark,
which is a tougher competition than Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Model fit and predictive accuracy
The ﬁrst question to address is how well models ﬁt and predict on a game-by-game basis (i.e.,
when EWA parameters are estimated separately for each game). As noted, to limit over-
ﬁtting we estimate parameters using 70% of the subjects (in-sample calibration) and use those
estimates to predict choices by the remaining 30% (out-of-sample validation). For in-sample
estimation we report a Bayesian information criterion (BIC) which subtracts a penalty k·ln(NT )2
from the L(λ) value. For out-of-sample validation we report the log-likelihood (L(λ)) on the
hold-out sample of 30% of the subjects.
Table 2 shows the results. The table also shows the choice probability implied by the
average likelihood17 compared to the probability if choices were random. Across games, self-
tuning EWA predicts a little worse than EWA in out-of-sample prediction, though generally
more accurately than QRE. This is not surprising since the parametric EWA model uses four
extra free parameters (δ, φ, κ and N (0)) in each game. The correlation between the φ function
of self-tuning and the φ estimates of EWA is 0.77 and the corresponding correlation for the δ
is 0.32.18 However, self-tuning EWA is better in the pooled estimation where a common set
of parameters (except λ, which is always game-speciﬁc) was used for EWA. QRE ﬁts worst in
both individual games and pooled estimation, which is no surprise because it does not allow
learning.
A more challenging robustness test is to estimate all parameters on six of the seven games,
then use those parameters to predict choices in the remaining seventh game for all subjects.
This is done for each of the seven games, one at a time. Cross-game prediction has been used
by others but only within similar games in a class (2x2 games with mixed equilibria, Erev and
Roth, 1998; and 5x5 symmetric games, Stahl, 2000). Our results test whether ﬁtting a model
on a coordination game, say, can predict behavior in a game with mixed equilibrium. This
17That is, divide the total log likelihood by the number of subject-periods. Exponentiating this number gives
the geometric mean (“average”) predicted probability of the strategies that are actually played.
18The parameter estimates are reported in Table A.1.
is the most ambitious use of learning models across games since Roth and Erev (1995) who
demonstrated the importance of this kind of cross-game forecasting.
Table 3 reports results from the cross-game prediction. By this measure, self-tuning EWA
has the highest cross-game likelihood in three games; EWA is highest in four other games. QRE
is the least accurate in six out of the seven games.
Likelihood values summarize the model ﬁt over time, strategies and subjects; but they do not
allow one to gauge how model ﬁt changes over time and across strategies. To get a more nuanced
feel for the ﬁt between data and models, the next section produces graphs using predicted and
relative frequencies for three games which are exemplars of three classes: The patent race game
has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, the continental divide coordination game has multiple
Pareto-ranked pure equilibria, and the beauty contest games are dominance-solvable.19
3.3 Games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium: Patent races
In the patent race game two players, one strong and one weak, are endowed with resources and
compete in a patent race. The strong player has an endowment of 5 units and the weak player
has an endowment of 4 units (Rapoport and Amaldoss, 2000). They simultaneously invest
an integer amount up to their endowments, istrong and iweak. The player whose investment is
strictly larger earns 10 minus their investment. A player whose investment is less than or equal
to the other player’s investment earns no payoﬀ, and ends up with their endowment minus the
investment.
The game has an interesting strategic structure. The strong player can guarantee a payoﬀ of
ﬁve by investing the entire endowment istrong = 5 (out-spending the weak player), which strictly
dominates investing zero (istrong = 0). Eliminating the strong player’s dominated strategy
istrong = 0 then makes iweak = 1 a dominated strategy for the weak player (since she can never
win by investing one unit). Iterating in this way, the strong player deletes istrong ∈ {0, 2, 4} and
the weak player deletes iweak ∈ {1, 3} by iterated application of strict dominance. The result is
a unique mixed equilibrium in which strong players invest ﬁve 60% of the time and play their
other two (serially) undominated strategies of investing one and three 20% of the time, and
weak players invest zero 60% of the time and invest either two or four 20% of the time.
19Corresponding graphs for all games can be seen at http://www.bschool.nus.edu.sg/Staﬀ/bizcjk/fewa.htm so
that readers can draw their own conclusions about other games.
Thirty six pairs of subjects played the game in a random matching protocol 160 times
(with the role switched after 80 rounds); the 36 pairs are divided into 2 groups where random
matching occurs within group. Since overall choice frequencies do not change visibly across
time, and are rather close to equilibrium predictions, our plots show frequencies of transitions
between period t−1 and period t strategies to focus on changes across time. Figures 2a-d show
the empirical transition matrix and predicted transition frequencies across the ﬁve strategies
(istrong ∈ {0, 1, · · ·5}) for strong players, using the within-game estimation and pooling across
all subjects. (Weak-player results are similar.)
The key features of the data are the high percentage of transitions from 5 to 5, almost
40%, and roughly equal numbers of transitions (about 5%) from 1 to 1, and from 1 to 5 or
vice versa. The ﬁgures show that QRE does not predict diﬀerences in transitions at all. The
challenge for explaining transitions is that after investing istrong = 5, about 80% of the time the
strong player knows that the weak player invested only 0 or 2. Most learning models predict
that strong players should therefore invest less, but the ﬁgures show that about half the time
the strong players invest 5 again. The self-tuning and parametric EWA models explain the
relatively low rate of downward transitions by multiplying the high foregone payoﬀs, in the case
where the strong player invested 5 and the weak player invested nothing or two, by a relatively
low value of δ. This means the attractions for low istrong are not updated as much as the chosen
strategy istrong = 5, which explains the persistence of investing and the low rate of switching.
The low value of δ, which is estimated to be .30 in EWA and averages .16 in self-tuning EWA,
is one way of expressing why strong players are sluggish in switching down from istrong = 5.
3.4 Games with multiple pure strategy equilibria: Continental divide game
Van Huyck et al. (1997) studied a coordination game with multiple equilibria and extreme
sensitivity to initial conditions, which we call the continental divide game (CDG).
Subjects play in cohorts of seven people. Subjects choose an integer from 1 to 14, and their
payoﬀ depends on their own choice and on the median choice of all seven players. The payoﬀ
matrix is constructed so that there are two pure equilibria (at 3 and 12) which are Pareto-
ranked (12 pays $1.12 and 3 pays $.60). The best-response correspondence bifurcates in the
middle: For all M ≤ 7, the best response to a median M is strictly between M and 3. For high
medians M ≥ 8, the best response is strictly between M and 12. The payoﬀ at 3 is about half
as much as at 12. This game captures the possibility of extreme sensitivity to initial conditions
(or path-dependence).
Their experiment used 10 cohorts of seven subjects each, playing for 15 periods. At the end
of each period subjects learned the median, and played again with the same group in a partner
protocol.
Figures 3a-d show empirical frequencies (pooling all subjects) and model predictions. The
key features of the data are: Bifurcation over time from choices in the middle of the range
(5-10) to the extremes, near the equilibria at 3 and 12; and late-period choices are more sharply
clustered around 12 than around 3. (Figure 3a hides strong path-dependence: Groups which had
ﬁrst-period M ≤ 7 (M ≥ 8) always converged toward the low (high) equilibrium.) Notice also
that strategies 1-4 are never chosen in early periods, but are frequently chosen in later periods;
and oppositely, strategies 7-9 are frequently chosen in early periods but never chosen in later
periods. A good model should be able to capture these subtle eﬀects by ”accelerating” low
choices quickly (going from zero to frequent choices in a few periods) and ”braking” midrange
choices quickly (going from frequent 7-9 choices to zero).
QRE ﬁts poorly because it predicts no movement. Self-tuning EWA and parametric EWA
are fairly accurate and able to explain the key features of the data– viz., convergence toward the
two equilibria, sharper convergence around 12 than around 3, and rapid increase in strategies
1-4 and extinction of 7-9. Both this game and the game above show how self-tuning EWA is
able to reproduce the predictive power of EWA without having to estimate parameters.
3.5 Games with dominance-solvable pure strategy equilibrium: p-Beauty
Contests
In the p-beauty contests of Ho et al. (1998), seven players simultaneously choose numbers in
[0,100]. The player whose number is closest to a known fraction (either 0.7 or 0.9) of the group
average wins a ﬁxed prize. Their experiment also manipulated experience of subjects because
half of them played a similar game before. Initial choices are widely dispersed and centered
around 45. When the game is repeated, numbers gradually converge toward the equilibrium 0
and experienced subjects converge much faster towards equilibrium.
Figures 4a-f show empirical frequencies and model predictions of self-tuning EWA and EWA
broken down by experience of subjects. (As in the earlier plots, QRE ﬁts badly so it is omitted.)
Self-tuning EWA tracks behavior about as accurately as EWA for inexperienced subjects, and
is substantially more accurate for experienced subjects. The cross-game EWA estimate of φ
used is 0.83, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the in-game estimate φ of 0.31. The cross-game
estimate of δ used is 0.29, lower than the in-game estimate δ of 0.70.20 These cross-game
values create the sluggishness in responding to surprises (φ is too high) and to the many better
strategies available (δ is too low).
The average self-tuning function φi(t) is 0.58, which is relatively more responsive to surprises
than the 0.83 cross-game estimate. Coupled with the δij(t) function, which by deﬁnition is
totally responsive to better strategies, this helps to explain why self-tuning EWA predicts
behavior better. The sluggish response to surprise of EWA also explains why EWA is less
accurate than its self-tuning cousin in experienced session; experienced subjects create more
surprises than their inexperienced counterparts as they move faster to convergence.
4 Conclusion
Learning is clearly important for economics. Equilibrium theories are useful because they
suggest a possible limit point of a learning process and permit comparative static analysis. But
if learning is slow, or the time path of behavior selects one equilibrium out of many, a precise
theory of equilibration is crucial for knowing which equilibrium will result, and how quickly.
The theory described in this paper, self-tuning EWA, replaces the key parameters in the
EWA learning models with functions that change over time in response to experience. One
function is a “change detector” φ which goes up (limited by one) when behavior by other
players is stable, and dips down (limited by zero) when there is surprising new behavior by
others. When φ dips down, the eﬀects of old experience (summarized in attractions which
cumulate or average previous payoﬀs) is diminished by decaying the old attraction by a lot.
The second “attention” function δ is one for strategies that yield better than actual payoﬀ
and zero otherwise. This function ties sensitivity to foregone payoﬀs to attention, which is
likely to be on strategies that give better than actual payoﬀ ex post. Self-tuning EWA is more
parsimonious than most learning theories because it has only one free parameter– the response
sensitivity λ.
20Both in-game and cross-game estimates are reported in the Table A.2.
We report ﬁt and prediction of data from seven experimental games using self-tuning EWA,
the parameterized EWA model, and quantal response equilibrium (QRE). Both QRE and self-
tuning EWA have one free parameter, and EWA has ﬁve. We report both in-sample ﬁt (penal-
izing more complex theories using the Bayesian information criterion) and out-of-sample as well
as out-of-game predictive accuracy, to be sure that many complex models do not necessarily ﬁt
better.
There are two key results.
First, self-tuning EWA ﬁts and predicts slightly worse than EWA in all seven games; and it
produces a functional parameter values for φ and δ which roughly track the estimated values of
ﬁxed parameters across games. Self-tuning EWA therefore represents one solution to the central
problem of ﬂexibly generating EWA-like parameters across games. Because self-tuning EWA
generates sensible cross-game parameter variation automatically, it ﬁts and predicts better than
other models when games are pooled and common parameters are estimated.
Second, the functions in self-tuning EWA seem to be robust across games. Our working
paper added three brand new games which are not reported here (after the ﬁrst version was
written and circulated, and people were invited to submit games for analysis) to test robustness.
The basic conclusions are replicated in these games, which have incomplete information and
choices are made by groups rather than individuals (see our working paper).
A next step in this research is to ﬁnd some axiomatic underpinnings for the functions.
Extending the φ function to exploit information about ordered strategies might prove useful.
And since self-tuning EWA is so parsimonious, it is useful as a building block for extending
learning theories to include sophistication (players anticipating that others are learning; see
Stahl, 1999) and explain “teaching” behavior in repeated games (Camerer, Ho and Chong
2002; Cooper and Kagel, 2004).
The self-tuning functions can also potentially do something that people do well– respond to
changes in structural parameters of games over time (like demand shocks or the entry of new
players)– which models that estimate parameters from history will do poorly. Since many nat-
urally occurring economic games do have unanticipated shocks which change payoﬀs, exploring
how people and models perform in games like this is worthwhile.
The theory is developed to ﬁt experimental data, but the bigger scientiﬁc payoﬀ will come
from application to naturally-occurring situations. If learning is slow, a precise theory of eco-
nomic equilibration is just as useful for predicting what happens in the economy as a theory
of equilibrium. For example, institutions for matching medical residents and medical schools,
and analogous matching in college sororities and college bowl games, developed over decades
(Roth and Xing, 1994). Bidders in eBay auctions learn to bid late to hide their information
about an object’s common value (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003). Consumers learn over time what
products they like (Ho and Chong, 2003). Learning in ﬁnancial markets can generate excess
volatility and returns predictability, which are otherwise anomalous in rational expectations
models (Timmerman, 1993). Sargent (1999) argues that learning by policymakers about ex-
pectational Phillips’ curves and the public’s perceptions of inﬂation explains macroeconomic
behavior in the last couple of decades. Good theories of learning should be able to explain these
patterns and help predict how new institutions will evolve, how rapidly bidders learn to wait,
and which new products will succeed. Applying self-tuning EWA, and other learning theories,
to ﬁeld domains is therefore an important goal of future research.
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Table 1: A Description of the Seven Games Used in the Estimation of Various Learning Models
Game Number of Number of Number of Pure Number of Number of Matching Experimental Description of Games
Players Strategies Strategy Equilibria Subjects Rounds Protocol Treatment
Mixed Strategies 2 4,6 0 80 40 Fixed Stake Size A constant-sum game with unique mixed
Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997) strategy equilibrium. 
Patent Race 2 5,6 0 36 80 Random Strong vs Weak Strong (weak) player invests between
Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) 0 and 5 (0 and 4) and the higher investment
wins a fixed prize.
Continental Divide 7 14 2 70 15 Fixed None A coordination game with two pure strategy 
Van Huyck et al. (1997) equilibria
Median Action 9 7 7 54 10 Fixed None A order-statistic game with individual payoff
Van Huyck et al. (1990) decreases in the distance between individual
choice and the median
Pot Games 3,6,9,18 2 1 84 25 (manual) Fixed Number of Players An entry game where players must decide
Amaldoss and Ho (2001) 28 (computer) which of the two ponds of sizes 2n and n 
they wish to enter. Payoff is the ratio of the pond
size and number of entries.
Price Matching 2 1211 1 52 10 Random Penalty Size Players choose claims between 80 and 200.
(Traveller's Dilemma) Both players get lower claim but the high-claim
Capra et al. (1999) player pays a penalty to the low-claim player.
 
p-Beauty Contest 7 101 1 196 10 Fixed Experienced vs. Inexperienced Players simultaneously choose a number
Ho et al. (1998) from 0 to 100 and the winner whose number is
closet to p (<1) times the group average
Note 1: Continuous strategies of 80 to 200 are discretized to 121 integer strategies
Table 2: Model Fit
Mixed Patent Continental Median Pot p-Beauty Price
Data Set Strategies Race Divide Action Games Contest Matching Pooled 2
Total Sample Size 3200 5760 1050 540 2217 1960 520 15247
In-sample Calibration
Sample Size 2240 4000 735 380 1478 1380 360 10573
BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) 1
Self-tuning EWA -3206 -4367 -1203 -309 -938 -5184 -1451 -16672
EWA -3040 -4399 -1091 -293 -931 -4987 -1103 -16646
QRE -3442 -6686 -1923 -549 -1003 -6254 -1420 -21285
Average Probability
Self-tuning EWA 23.9% 33.6% 19.5% 44.6% 53.1% 2.3% 1.8%
EWA 26.0% 33.5% 23.2% 48.1% 53.9% 2.7% 4.9%
QRE 21.6% 18.8% 7.3% 23.8% 50.8% 1.1% 2.0%
Random 20.4% 18.3% 7.1% 14.3% 50.0% 1.0% 0.8%
Out-of-sample Validation
Sample Size 960 1760 315 160 739 580 160 4674
Log-likelihood
Self-tuning EWA -1394 -1857 -522 -94 -441 -2348 -586 -7246
EWA -1342 -1876 -482 -89 -433 -2203 -532 -7366
QRE -1441 -3006 -829 -203 -486 -2667 -607 -9240
Note 1: BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) is given by LL - (k/2)*log(N*T) where k is the number of parameters, N is the number of subjects and T is the number of periods.
Note 2: A common set of parameters, except game-specific λ, is estimated for all games. Each game is given equal weight in LL estimation.
Table 3: Out-of-sample Prediction Using Out-game Estimates
Mixed Patent Continental Median Pot p-Beauty Price
Data Set Strategies Race Divide Action Games Contest Matching
Total Sample Size 3200 5760 1050 540 2217 1960 520
Log-likelihood
Self-tuning EWA -4602 -7114 -1723 -419 -1399 -8282 -2192
EWA -4733 -6321 -1839 -457 -1365 -7806 -2140
QRE -4667 -9132 -2758 -957 -1533 -8911 -2413
Average Probability
Self-tuning EWA 23.7% 29.1% 19.4% 46.0% 53.2% 1.5% 1.5%
Random 20.4% 18.3% 7.1% 14.3% 50.0% 1.0% 0.8%
Table A.1: Parameter Estimates
Mixed Patent Continental Median Pot p-Beauty Price
Data Set Strategies Race Divide Action Games Contest Matching Pooled
Self-tuning EWA
φ  function 0.89 0.89 0.69 0.85 0.80 0.58 0.63 0.76
δ  function 0.17 0.16 0.47 0.21 0.23 0.38 0.59 0.32
λ 4.13 9.24 4.45 5.64 7.34 2.39 10.02 5.87
EWA
φ 0.97 0.91 0.72 0.73 0.86 0.31 0.80 0.79
δ 0.19 0.30 0.90 0.94 0.00 0.70 0.40 0.41
κ 0.82 0.15 0.77 0.99 0.92 0.91 0.80 0.28
Ν0 0.67 0.73 0.36 0.14 0.00 0.17 0.39 0.77
λ 0.34 4.27 13.83 18.55 1.61 2.57 9.88 6.33
QRE
λ 1.12 0.81 1.83 28.45 3.37 0.69 29.83 9.44
Table A.2: Parameter Comparison of Self-tuning EWA with In-game and Out-game EWA
Mixed Patent Continental Median Pot p-Beauty Price
Data Set Strategies Race Divide Action Games Contest Matching
φ function (Self-tuning EWA) 0.89 0.89 0.69 0.85 0.80 0.58 0.63
In-game φ (EWA) 0.97 0.91 0.72 0.73 0.86 0.31 0.80
Out-game φ (EWA) 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.81
δ function (Self-tuning EWA) 0.17 0.16 0.47 0.21 0.23 0.38 0.59
In-game δ (EWA) 0.19 0.30 0.90 0.94 0.00 0.70 0.40
Out-game δ (EWA) 0.50 0.40 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.43
φδ
κ
0
1
0
1
0
1
Average
Reinforcement
Fictitious Play
Cournot
Weighted Fictitious
Play
Figure 1: The EWA Learning Cube
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Figure 2 Transition Matrices for Patent Race
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Figure 2a: Empirical Transition
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Figure 2b: Self-tuning EWA
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Figure 2c: Parametric EWA
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Figure 2d: Quantal Response Equilibrium
Figure 3: Empirical Frequency and Model Predictions for Continental Divide
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Figure 3a: Empirical Frequency
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Figure 3b: Self-tuning EWA
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Figure 3c: Parametric EWA 
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Figure 3d: Quantal Response Equilibrium
Figure 4: Empirical Frequency and Model Predictions for p-Beauty Contest
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Figure 4a: Empirical Frequency (Experienced Subject)
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Figure 4d: Empirical Frequency (Inexperienced Subject)
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Figure 4b: Self-tuning EWA (Experienced Subject)
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Figure 4e: Self-tuning EWA (inexperienced Subject)
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Figure 4c: Adaptive EWA (Experienced Subject)
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Figure 4f: Adaptive EWA (Inexperienced Subject)
